Based on the fixed point theory, this paper proposes a new scheme for image integrity authentication, which is very different from digital signature and fragile watermarking. By the new scheme, the sender transforms an original image into a fixed point image (very close to the original one) of a wellchosen transform and sends the fixed point image (instead of the original one) to the receiver; using the same transform, the receiver checks the integrity of the received image by testing whether it is a fixed point image and locates the tampered areas if the image has been modified during the transmission. A realization of the new scheme is based on Gaussian convolution and deconvolution (GCD) transform, for which an existence theorem of fixed points is proved. The semifragility is analyzed via commutativity of transforms, and three commutativity theorems are found for the GCD transform. Three iterative algorithms are presented for finding a fixed point image with a few numbers of iterations, and for the whole procedure of image integrity authentication; a fragile authentication system and a semifragile one are separately built. Experiments show that both the systems have good performance in transparence, fragility, security, and tampering localization. In particular, the semifragile system can perfectly resist the rotation by a multiple of 90°flipping and brightness attacks.
Image Integrity Authentication Scheme
Fragile Watermarking [2] . Digital signature, mainly using cryptography techniques, has been playing a very important role in the fields of integrity authentication, identity authentication, etc. Fragile watermarking is an active branch of information embedding; it is now an effective method for integrity authentication with tampering detection.
Each of the two methods has its own advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of digital signature lie in keeping the original image unchanged, and in the high security of key agreement; the disadvantages lie in additional signature information (or hash value), and in the difficulty of tampering localization and robustness. The advantages of fragile watermarking lie in transparence, tampering localization and robustness; the disadvantages include the modification of the original image (although slightly, but irreversibly in general), complicated agreement of key and watermarking, and lower security. Both methods are widely used; due to the advantages and disadvantages of each method, the preference of the methods depends on the requirements of users.
Thinks to the numerous applications, many authors have been showing great enthusiasm both in digital signature and in fragile watermarking, and have developed many efficient algorithms. For digital signature, the hash function is the main focus in designing content-based authentication, and some efforts have been done in tampering localization and robustness [3] - [6] . For fragile watermarking, in addition to transparence and tampering localization, people also care about other watermarking characters, such as ownership verification [7] , [8] , robustness [9] - [14] , image restoration [15] - [17] , special applications [18] - [20] , etc. Many of these watermarking algorithms are successfully used in image integrity authentication, and a lot of fragile [7] , [8] , [18] , [20] or semi-fragile [10] , [14] , [15] , [21] - [24] authentication systems have been achieved. In particular, the semi-fragility has been attracting more and more attention due to its applications in the content-based authentication, for which many techniques have been developed: see for example the discrete cosine transform (DCT) [10] , [14] , [15] , [21] and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [22] - [24] techniques for watermark embedding.
Unfortunately, with the use of complex computing techniques in the authentication procedure, the algorithms for digital signature and fragile (or semi-fragile) watermarking become more and more complicated. It seems difficult to obtain significant improvements of the existing algorithms without introducing really new ideas. We thus believe that the proposition of an alternative approach will be interesting for the development of image integrity authentication algorithms.
In this paper, we propose a new integrity authentication scheme, completely different to the digital signature and watermarking techniques. The key idea of the new scheme is to find, in a very small neighborhood (the closest one in most cases) of the original image function, a fixed point image function of a simple explicitly defined transform. In our new scheme, the original image is transferred to a fixed point image of a well chosen transform f k (·) (where k indicates the key that we will use). The transform f k (·) should have nice properties leading to good transparence, fragility, security and tampering localization ability for the fixed point images; it will be constructed by a careful consideration of Gaussian Convolution and Deconvolution, and will be called GCD transform. A theorem (see Theorem 1 of Section IV) will be established to show the existence of a fixed point of the GCD transform f k (·) in the closest neighborhood of the original image. It will also be shown (see Theorems 3, 4 and 5 of Section V) that f k (·) has the nice property that it is commutative with the rotation, transpose and translation operations, leading to the perfect semi-fragility of the corresponding integrity authentication. Three algorithms will be given to obtain with a few iterations a fixed point image of f k (·), which is very close to the original image. Based on the good properties of the GCD transform, two different authentication systems will be given: one is fragile, the other is semi-fragile. Experimental results are given showing that both systems have good performance in transparence, fragility, security and tampering localization. In particular, the semi-fragile system is proved to be able to resist perfectly the following usual attacks: the rotation by an angle of n × 90°(with n an integer), flipping and brightness attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the new scheme of image integrity authentication is given based on the fixed point theory. In Section III, using Gaussian Convolution and Deconvolution and taking into account the specificity of image functions, the GCD transform is constructed. In Section IV, a theorem for the existence of fixed points for the GCD transform is proved. The semifragility is analyzed in Section V, via the commutativity of the concerned transforms. In Section VI, based on the existence theorem of fixed points, three methods are given for finding fixed point images in an appropriate image space. In Section VII, we propose a fragile authentication system with three algorithms corresponding to the three methods mentioned above, and present experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in transparency, fragility and tempering localization. In Section VIII, we give a semi-fragile authentication system, and present experimental results to show the semi-fragility of the system with respect to rotation, flipping and brightness attacks, by comparing our method with other ones. Section IX concludes the paper.
As information, we mention that a preliminary version of the present work can be found in arXiv [25] .
II. INTEGRITY AUTHENTICATION VIA FIXED POINT IMAGE
For a given mapping f : D → D, if there exists x ∈ D such that f (x) = x, then x is called a fixed point of the mapping f in the space D. We consider the case where x is an image, f an operation on images, and D a space of images. When f is well chosen, the set of fixed points of f is sparse in D, so that almost any change will make a fixed point image to be a non-fixed point image, since a fixed point image has very little chance to be changed into another fixed point due to the sparsity of the fixed points. This means that a fixed point image has the fragility property. Therefore a fixed point image can be used as a stego-image during the authentication process.
The mathematical model of the image integrity authentication scheme based on fixed point images is described as follows. We consider grayscale images in this paper. An will also be identified as a matrix whose general terms
be a given image, K be the key space,
256 be a transform of images associated with a key k ∈ K . The transform f k (·) can be used for image integrity authentication if it satisfies the following conditions:
1) the transform f k (·) has sparse fixed points in space Z M×N 256 ; 2) after a few iterations, from the image I one can reach a fixed point J (i.e. f k (J ) = J ); 3) the fixed point image J and the original image I should not be distinguished visually. The first condition concerns the existence and sparsity of the fixed points, which are the foundations of the scheme. If f k (·) has no fixed point, the scheme will be infeasible; if the fixed points are dense in space Z M×N 256 , a randomly selected image will have a large probability to pass the authentication, then the scheme will be vulnerable to attacks and there will be missed alarms. The second condition implies the practicality; it means that a fixed point image can be obtained quickly from any given image after a few numbers of iterations, so that the proposed scheme can efficiently treat a lot of images. The third condition concerns the transparency; it means that the fixed point image J should be very close to the original image I, so that the fixed points of the transform f k (·) should not be sparse excessively.
The three conditions may seem to have some conflicting goals. However, we will find a good transform, called GCD transform (see (11) ), for which the three conditions are satisfied simultaneously as shown in Sections VI and VII by analysis and experiments.
The security of the scheme closely relies on the secret key k. If the key space K is large enough, the scheme is safe even when the algorithm is public.
Let's now present the authentication procedure via fixed point image. Firstly, the sender and the receiver agree on a private key k and a well-chosen transform f k (·). Secondly, the sender generates from the original image I a fixed point image J of the transform f k (·), and sends J (instead of I ) to the receiver through a public channel. Thirdly, for the suspicious received image J (which may be different from J because J may be tampered during the transmission), the receiver calculates f k (J ) and compares it with J , to judge the integrity of the fixed point image J . If J is a fixed point of f k (·), then he concludes that J = J , that is, the image J has not been changed during the transmission. When J is not a fixed point, then he concludes that J = J , that is, the image J has been tampered during the transmission; moreover, the tampered zones are the set (s, t) :
where the two images J and f k (J ) are different.
Notice that in our authentication procedure, the receiver needs only the secret key (and an algorithm to calculate the fixed point image); he does not need any additional information about the received image. In this sense our method is blind.
The framework of the above authentication scheme is presented in Fig. 1 . This scheme is simpler than fragile watermarking and digital signature, since it does not embed watermarks into the original image or produce extra signature information from the original image. In this authentication scheme, the most important thing is to find out a suitable transform f k (·). In the following section, a transform meeting the above three conditions is constructed with Gaussian convolution and deconvolution.
III. GAUSSIAN CONVOLUTION AND DECONVOLUTION
In this section, we introduce some basic knowledge about Gaussian convolution [26] , Gaussian deconvolution and Fourier transform, which will be used to construct the transform f k (·) that we need for the authentication.
Let g σ be a Gaussian kernel on R 2 defined by
where
. For an image function I defined on R 2 , the Gaussian convolution is defined as
Gaussian convolution is perhaps the most used operation in image processing. For simplicity, we write G σ (I ) for the Gaussian convolution:
We can regard G σ (·) as a transformation which transforms an image I to its convolution with the Gaussian kernel g σ . In practical computation of convolution (resp. deconvolution), Fourier transform is an efficient tool, which translates a convolution (resp. multiplication) in the spatial domain to a multiplication (resp. convolution) in the frequency domain, via the following famous convolution formulas:
where F(·) denotes the Fourier transform and h represents an image function. Accordingly, we denote by F −1 (·) the inverse Fourier transform. Since F [G σ (I )] = F(I ) · F(g σ ), using the inverse Fourier transform, we have an alternative expression for the Gaussian convolution:
Gaussian deconvolution is to restore the original image function I when g σ and G σ (I ) are given. It is more difficult to calculate compared with the Gaussian convolution.
Note that the denominator F(g σ ) has no zero points, so that the deconvolution G −1 σ (·) is well defined. However the value of F(g σ ) can be very close to 0 (especially when σ is large), which could cause a problem in the numerical calculation. In this paper we take σ ≤ 0.4246 (this constant is explained in Section IV), so that the value of F(g σ ) is not too close to 0.
The properties of Fourier transform show that G σ (·) and G −1 σ (·) are both linear operators:
Since we use the convention that an image function takes only integer values, a rounding operation must be executed to the result of convolution or deconvolution. The rounding function is defined as follows: for each real x,
where n ∈ Z and x ∈ [n, n + 1). Taking into account the rounding operation, for a given image I and σ > 0, we define the Gaussian Convolution and Deconvolution (GCD) transform as follows:
In general, I and f σ (I ) are not identical, and the difference between them increases with the value of σ .
Recall that in our model (see Section II), the space of image functions is Z M×N 256 , that is, we use image functions defined on a square lattice of size M × N (instead of functions on R 2 ), with values in Z 256 = {0, 1, . . . , 255}. We then use the discrete version of the above introduced Gaussian convolution and deconvolution formulas and the discrete Fourier transforms. For simplicity, we shall use the same notation. Notice that sometimes, f σ (I ) may jump out of the image space Z M×N 256 . In that case we shall need a truncating operation, as we shall see in the algorithms.
IV. EXISTENCE OF FIXED POINTS
OF THE GCD TRANSFORM Let R M×N and Z M×N be respectively the M × N dimensional real space and integer space. Then for any 8-bits grayscale image I of size M × N, we have I ∈ Z M×N 256 ⊂ Z M×N ⊂ R M×N . As further notation, for a matrix I , we denote by I (s, t) its general term at the position (s, t). We denote by |I | the matrix whose elements are the absolute values of the corresponding elements of I , and we write min(I ) (resp. max(I )) for the minimum (resp. maximum) value of the elements of I . For any a ∈ R, we write I + a for the matrix obtained by adding a constant a to each element of I ; it represents the translation of the image function I by a.
Definition: For σ > 0 and
Proof of Lemma 1: By the definition of Gaussian convolution, we have:
where h(s, t) > 0 is the normalization coefficient of the convolution template:
We now give an upper bound of H (s, t) to end the proof. For n = max{M, N}, we have
Thus, for H (s, t), we get
This ends the proof of Part (a). On the event that I (s, t) ∈ (−0.5, 0.5) for all (s, t), by the convolution formula (13), it is easily seen that (G σ (I )) (s, t) ∈ (−0.5, 0.5) also for all (s, t). This ends the proof of Part (b). Notice that the upper bound of H (s, t) can be improved, but the simple bound 4e − 1 2σ 2 is already enough for our purpose. For x ∈ R, we denote by {x} = R(x)−x the remainder of x after rounding, and we have {x} ∈ [−0.5, 0.5]. For I ∈ R M×N , we denote by {I } the remainder matrix whose elements are {I (s, t)} for all (s, t).
Remark 1: With the above notation, since now, for I ∈ Z M×N and all (s, t), we always suppose that P {G σ (I )} (s, t) ∈ (−0.5, 0.5) = 1. Then by Lemma 1 (b), we have, for all (s, t), P G σ ({G σ 
By Lemma 1(b) and Remark 1, with probability 1,
Lemma 3: For σ > 0 and I ∈ Z M×N , J = f σ (I ) is a GCD fixed point with probability 1, and G σ (
is a GCD fixed point with probability 1. For the second conclusion, we notice that
By Lemma 1 (b) and Remark 1,
The following theorem will be the key point of our authentication algorithms presented in Section VI.
Theorem 1:
Remark 2: (a) By Theorem 1, for a given image I ∈ Z M×N and a GCD transform f σ (·), a fixed point image can be easily found by the simple formula J = f σ (I ), and the pixel differences between the fixed point image and the original image are less than or equal to 1. But for images in Z M×N 256 , the fixed point obtained by the formula J = f σ (I ) may jump out of the image space Z M×N 256 . In fact, when I takes values in {0, . . . , 255}, by Theorem 1 we know that J = f σ (I ) takes values in {−1, . . . , 256}; actually, when I takes the value 0 or 255, it is possible that J takes the value −1 or 256. We will solve this problem by three methods: see Section VI.
(b) By Lemmas 2 and 3, both R[G −1 σ (I )] and f σ (I ) are fixed points of f σ (·). In our authentication algorithms we will use the fixed point J = f σ (I ) due to its property that G σ (I − J ) ∈ [−1, 1] M×N , which together with Lemma 1 imply the nice property that |I − J | ≤ 1.
(c) From the fact f σ (I ) is a fixed point of f σ (·) for all I , we deduce that f 2 σ = f σ indicating that the map is a projection operator.
(d) In Theorem 1 the range of σ can be slightly enlarged by choosing a shaper bound of H (s, t) in the proof of Lemma 1.
V. SEMI-FRAGILITY AND THE GCD TRANSFORM
In this section we show that the GCD transform defined in the preceding section has the nice property that it is commutative with the rotation by a multiple of 90°, transpose operation and translation transform, so that the corresponding integrity authentication system has semi-fragility.
We first show a close relation between the semi-fragility and the commutativity of some related transforms.
A. Semi-Fragility and Commutativity of Transforms
The semi-fragility means that the authentication system can tolerate content preserving modifications. Let us consider an integrity authentication system based on the GCD transform f k (·). From a given image I , the sender obtains a fixed point J of f k (·), and sends the fixed point image J instead of I to the receiver. During the transmission, suppose that J is attacked by a transform h(·), so that the receiver gets h(J ) as the received image. If h(J ) is also a fixed point of f k (·), then it can pass the receiver's test for integrity authentication. In this case we say that the authentication system based on f k (·) is semi-fragile with respect to the transform h(·) for the image J .
The following theorem shows that the semi-fragility property can be expressed via the commutativity of transforms.
Theorem 2: For a fixed point J of f k (·), the authentication system based on f k (·) is semi-fragile to a transform h(·), if and only if the transforms f k (·) and h(·) are commutative at J , that is
where • represents the composition operation.
is a fixed point of f k (·), so that the semi-fragility holds. Conversely, if the authentication system based on f k (·) is semifragile to the transform h(·) for J , then f k (h(J )) = h(J ) = h( f k (J )), so that (21) holds.
Remark 3: Similarly, the semi-fragility of watermarking can also be expressed by the commutativity of transforms. To see this, let I be the original image, and w be the watermark. For a secret key k, denote by E w,k (·) the embedding transform, and D k (·) the extracting transform of watermark, so that D k • E w,k (J ) = w for any image J , since the extracted watermark is w whenever the embedded watermark is w. The sender gets a watermarked image E w,k (I ), and sends it to the receiver. Suppose that the watermarked image E w,k (I ) is attacked by h(·) during the transmission, so that the receiver gets the image h • E w,k (I ). Then, for the image I , the watermarking system is semi-fragile to resist the transform h(·) if and only if
which means that transforms h(·) and E w,k (·) are commutative at I relative to the action of the transform D k (·). Notice that a sufficient condition for (22) to hold is the commutativity of h(·) and E w,k (·) at I , but this condition is in general not necessary as the extracting transform D k (·) is usually not a one-to-one map. The equivalence between the semi-fragility and the equality (22) can be seen as follows. If (22) holds, then from the received image h • E w,k (I ), we have
meaning that the receiver gets the original watermark w. Therefore the received image h(J ) can pass the authentication process, and the watermarking system is semi-fragile to the transform h(·) for the image I . Conversely, if the watermarking system is semi-fragile to the transform h(·) for the image I , then
so that (22) holds.
Although we can express the semi-fragility of watermarking in terms of a restricted commutativity of transforms (see Eq. (22)), this expression does not seem easy to be used in practice for a mathematical treatment of the semi-fragility, as the transforms E w,k (·) and D k (·) do not have analytical expressions, to the best of our knowledge. In fact this was one of our motivations to search for a new method with which a mathematical treatment of the semi-fragility is possible. Actually, such a mathematical treatment is possible for the authentication system based on the GCD transform f k (·), due to the advantage to have explicit mathematical expressions. This will be illustrated in the following by the study of the commutativity for two usually used transforms, through which the semi-fragility of the authentication system is shown.
B. Commutativity Property of the GCD Transform
In this subsection, we show three commutativity theorems of the GCD transform with respect to rotation, transpose operations and translation transform, which, together with Theorem 2, imply the semi-fragility of the authentication system.
For an image function I defined on R 2 , we consider its rotation by θ degree, denoted by T θ (I ): we have (T θ (I )) (x) = I (e iθ x), where a point x = (x 1 , x 2 ) of R 2 is identified with the complex number x 1 + i x 2 of the complex plan C.
Theorem 3: For all σ > 0, the rotation transform T θ (·) and the GCD transform f σ (·) are commutative, i.e. for all function I defined on R 2 , we have
Proof: By the properties of Fourier transform [26] , we have T θ (F(I )) = F(T θ (I )) and T θ (F −1 (I )) = F −1 (T θ (I )). Since the Gaussian kernel g σ is central symmetric and axial symmetric, we have T θ (g σ ) = g σ . Therefore by (4)-(6),
Now by the definition of T θ (·), for any functions I 1 and I 2 defined on R 2 , we have
Using this property for I 1 = F(I ) and
Similarly, for the Gaussian deconvolution G −1 σ (·), we have Proof: Since G σ (·) and G −1 σ (·) are both linear transforms (recall formulas (8) and (9)), and R(x + a) = R(x) + a is true when a is an integer, this theorem can be proved in the same way as above.
By the criterion of semi-fragility (Theorem 2), Theorems 3, 4 and 5 show that the integrity authentication system based on the GCD transform can resist brightness attack, rotation attack, transpose attack and flipping attack (which is a composition of rotation and transpose operations).
VI. METHODS FOR FINDING A FIXED POINT IMAGE
In this section, based on the theorem for the existence of fixed points of a GCD transform, three methods are given for finding a fixed point image in a certain grayscale image space. In order to reduce the computation cost and to enhance the security of the symmetric key, the Gaussian kernel in frequency domain is used.
A. Gaussian Kernel in Frequency Domain
Notice that the Fourier transform of g σ is also a Gaussian function, namely, the function
where σ = 1/σ . We will use the Gaussian kernel g σ in the frequency domain instead of the Gaussian convolution kernel in the spatial domain to calculate the Gaussian convolution and deconvolution. With the Gaussian kernel g σ , using the discrete Fourier transform F(·) and the inverse discrete Fourier transform F −1 (·), we can express the Gaussian convolution formula (6) and the Gaussian deconvolution formula (7) as
and write the GCD transform defined in (11) as
Here we use the notation G σ , G −1 σ and f σ instead of G σ , G −1 σ and f σ to insist that we will use σ as a parameter in the frequency domain.
It turns out that the GCD transform f σ satisfies the three conditions presented in Section 2: 1) sparsity, 2) easy computation, 3) transparence. In fact, Theorem 1 guarantee that a fixed image function of the GCD transform can be found in the 1-neibghhood (the set of image functions J such that |I − J | ≤ 1) of the original image function I , so that the conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Notice that the existence of a fixed point in the 1-neighborhood does not imply that the proportion of fixed points is too much, as there are in total 3 M×N (which is very large) different image functions in the 1-neghborhood of I . Our experiments in Section VII will show that a very slight change of pixel values of the fixed point image leads to a non-fixed point image, so that the condition 1 is also satisfied.
B. Three Methods for Finding a Fixed Point Image
Based on Theorem 1, for a given image I ∈ Z M×N 256 , when σ ≤ 0.4246, J = f σ (I ) is a GCD fixed point with |I − J | ≤ 1, with probability 1. As mentioned in Remark 2, if the image function I attains the value 0 or 255, J may take the value −1 or 256, so that J may jump out of the image space Z M×N 256 . This overflow problem should be considered carefully. In the following three methods are proposed to solve this problem and three corresponding algorithms are given.
Method 1: The first and simplest method is to do a truncation of the original image I before the GCD calculation. Notice that the overflow problem concerns only the pixel values 0 and 255. The simplest way to solve the overflow problem is to replace these values by their closest neighbors 1 and 254. This consideration leads to the following truncation procedure: we define the truncated imageĪ bȳ
for each point (s, t). Then by Theorem 1, with probability 1, J = f σ (Ī ) is a fixed point image, i.e. J = f σ (J ), and J ∈ Z M×N 256 . Method 2: The second method is a modification of the first one, which in general leads to a better image quality. The point is that we do not need to change all the pixel values 0 and 255, but only those which jump to −1 and 256. This consideration leads to the following improved version of the first method: firstly, calculate J = f σ (I ); then according to the overflow information of J , adjust the original image I toĨ defined bỹ
for each point (s, t). However, with this truncation, it may happen that J = f σ (Ĩ ) is still not in Z M×N 256 . In this case, we replace I by J and repeat the above adjustment procedure with J instead of I , and continue in this way if necessary, until a fixed point image is found in Z M×N 256 . Method 3: The third method is to truncate directly the obtained image J = f σ (I ) in order that J ∈ Z M×N 256 : we define the truncated imageJ bȳ
for each point (s, t). Notice that in general the truncated imageJ is no longer a GCD fixed point. But it may happen thatJ = I , so thatJ is a fixed point of the truncated GCD transform, defined as the composition of the GCD transform with the above truncation function. So ifJ = I , we then use the truncated GCD transform instead of the initial GCD transform for the integrity authentication. IfJ is not equal to I , we replace I byJ , and repeat the above adjustment procedure withJ instead of I ; we continue in this way if necessary, until a fixed point image of the truncated GCD transform is found.
For each of the three methods, we need to use an iteration procedure to find a fixed point in the 1-neighborhood. In fact, the computer itself truncates all of the data during the computation. In particular, when the value of {G −1 σ (I )} in (17) is equal to 0.5 or −0.5 (this may happen, although the theoretical probability of the appearance is 0 according to our hypothesis in Remark 1), it may happen that J = f σ (I ) is not a fixed point (recall that Theorem 1 only ensures that J = f σ (I ) is a fixed point with probability 1). This problem can be resolved by an iterative procedure, as shown by our experiments. The reason is that, the probability of hitting the exceptional event decreases with the iteration of the process.
In an extreme case, for very few images, there are few pixel values swinging during the iteration. In such a case we use an enlargement strategy to break the swinging by enlarging slightly the domain of research, thus making the iteration converge quickly. In our simulation, the mean value of the number of iterations (for the convergence) is less than 5 (Fig. 2) . When the number of iterations exceeds the double of the mean value, we think that it costs too much or it is even impossible to find a fixed point in the closest neighborhood (i.e. the 1-neighborhood {J : |J − I | ≤ 1}) of the image I obtained in the last step. So we enlarge the domain of research, trying to find a fixed point in a slightly larger neighborhood (i.e. the 2-neighborhood {J : |J − I | ≤ 2}). On the other hand, to keep good image quality (for the obtained message to remain quite close to the original one), the enlargement strategy should not be used too often. In our algorithms, for methods 1 and 3, we use the enlargement strategy only when the number of iterations is a multiple of the double of their mean value; for method 2, we use this strategy only for the marginal values −1 and 256 and when the number of iterations exceeds the double of the mean value. Our experiments show that the enlargement strategy is effective, with which the algorithm converges very quickly (very often it converges with a number of iterations less than 3). We also observe that in all our experiments, a fixed point has always been found in the 2-neighborhood of the original image, although we have not proved this theoretically. If by chance we find no fixed points in the 2-neighborhood, we could continue to enlarge the size of the neighborhood; we have not done this as we never met this situation in the experiments.
VII. FRAGILE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
In this section, according to the previous three methods, three algorithms are given to calculate the fixed point images, and to describe three fragile authentication systems. Experimental results with analyses are also shown on the transparence, fragility and tampering localization.
Before the presentation of the algorithms, let us first discuss the definition of keys with an analysis of security.
A. Keys and Security
The authentication scheme depends on the security of the secret key completely, so the key space should be large enough. Unfortunately, if σ (in the spatial domain) or σ (in the frequency domain) is used simply as the secret key, the corresponding key space cannot meet the security requirements. For example, for grayscale images of size 512 × 512, our simulation results show that when σ > 1000, the transform f σ (·) has too many fixed points, which results in poor fragility, while when σ < 250, the transform f σ (·) has too few fixed points, which results in a lot of iterative calculations; in addition, when σ is accurate to four decimal places, two adjacent parameters may lead to the same fixed point. In conclusion, for an image of size 512 × 512, the standard deviation σ should take values in the interval [250, 1000], and be accurate to three decimal places. Under these conditions, the number of values of σ is 1000, 000−250, 000 = 750, 000, so the size of the key space is 750,000 which lies between 2 19 and 2 20 . This size is too small to prevent exhaustive search, for applications where one requires high safety. In the following we will enlarge the key space by choosing some points of the Gaussian kernel g σ and changing slightly the values of the kernel at these points.
A secure and efficient key generating scheme based on the parameter σ is proposed as follows. Firstly, for an image of size M × N, construct a Gaussian kernel g σ with parameter σ . Our simulation shows that it is appropriate to take σ = r × (M + N) with r ∈ [0.25, 0.95]; for M = N = 512, this choice is consistent to the suggestion that σ ∈ [250, 1000] (see the paragraph above) since it gives the range σ = r (M + N) ∈ [256, 973]. Secondly, properly choose some points and modify the values of the Gaussian kernel at these points (the choice of the points and the modification of the values will be explained later). Since the kernel g σ takes values between 0 and 1, we take 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1 as possible modified values of g σ . In this way we obtain a modified Gaussian kernel named g k , where k presents the secret key consisting of the value of σ together with the chosen points and the modified values of the Gaussian kernel at these points. For example, given a grayscale image of size 512 × 512 and taking σ = 512.000, for the Gaussian kernel g σ constructed with σ , if we choose the points (1, 20) and (30, 100) and modify the values of g σ at these points to 0.6 and 0.5 respectively, then we can write the secret key k as follows:
512.000 1 20 0.6 30 100 0.5.
The value of g k coincides with that of g σ except at the points (1, 20) and (30, 100) where it takes the values 0.6 and 0.5 respectively.
The modification of the Gaussian kernel at some points leads to a larger key space, and thus increases the security of keys. With the modification of value of the Gaussian kernel at two points as in the above example, the size of the key space is larger than 2 19 × 512 4 × 10 2 ≈ 2 61 , with 2 19 the number of possible values of σ , 512 4 the number of choices of the two points (4 coordinates), and 10 2 the number of choices of values at the two points. In general, for an image with size of M × N, if we modify the value of the Gaussian kernel at n points and the modified values are taken in the 10 values {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}, the size of the key space is larger than 2 19 × M n × N n × 10 n . Thus the key space is large enough as long as (M, N, n) is not too small, and it is impossible for an attacker to find the real key by traversing all the values of σ , the coordinates and the modified values. Some principles should be followed when we modify the Gaussian kernel.
On the premise of ensuring the security of the key generating scheme, the kernel should be modified as less as possible, and at the same time, the chosen points should be sufficiently far away from the center of the kernel.
For, too many modifications of the kernel may influence the iterative calculation and the quality of the fixed point images, and the positions around the center correspond to the low frequency components of the images that we desire to keep invariant.
B. Algorithm for Image Integrity Authentication
We now present our algorithms for image integrity authentication via fixed point image, based on the authentication procedure described in Section 2 and the three methods given in Section VI. Firstly, the sender and the receiver agree in advance on a secret key k consisting of the value of σ together with the chosen points and the modified values of the Gaussian kernel g σ at these points. Based on the secret key, thanks to the formulas (28)-(30), the sender and the receiver have the same modified Gaussian convolution transform
and the same modified Gaussian deconvolution transform
Thus they have the same modified GCD transform
Secondly, for a given image I , with one of the three algorithms given below the sender finds a fixed point J of f k (·) obtained from I , and then sends J to the receiver through a public channel.
Thirdly, the receiver gets a suspicious image J and judges whether the received image is identical to the original image J, by checking whether J is a fixed point image with the same algorithm as that used by the sender; by the same time, the tampered areas are localized.
The precise algorithms are stated in the following. Corresponding to Methods 1, 2 and 3, we have:
Let us give some comments on the algorithms based on simulation results. For different values of σ varying from 300 to 800, we calculate the Gaussian kernel g σ , and modify its values at the points (1, 2), (3, 1) and (10, 10) to 0.5, 0.5 and 0.6 respectively, thus we get the set of modified Gaussian kernels indexed by σ . With the image database FREEFOTO [27] (5000 grayscale images with sizes of 400 × 600), for each of the three algorithms, the number of iterations is recorded for each image, and its mean value is calculated with different values of the parameter σ ; the curves of the mean values are drawn in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2 we can see that the mean value of the number of iterations is less than 5, and it decreases as σ increases. This shows that the modified GCD transform satisfies the second condition presented in Section II, and suggests that the number of fixed point images increases as σ increases. Fig. 2 also shows that Algorithm 1 performs best in iteration times. But in fact, Algorithm 3 runs fastest among the three algorithms since Algorithm 1 needs to calculate the GCD transform twice in each iteration.
C. Transparence
The transparence of fixed point images is essentially determined by the values of σ . The following experiments show that the transparence increases as the parameter σ increases. The image database FREEFOTO is used for testing, and the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) is used to evaluate the quality of images. For different values of σ varying from 300 to 800, we record the PSNR values for the fixed point images with respect to the modified Gaussian kernel. Then, we calculate the mean value of PSNR for each σ , and draw Algorithm 1 (Based on Method 1) the quality curve. In Fig. 3 (a) , the simulation results show that the image quality is well kept, even when σ is equal to 300. This illustrates that the modified GCD transform satisfies the third condition presented in Section II: that is, the obtained fixed point images are very close to the original images. Fig. 3 also shows that Algorithms 2 and 3 perform better than Algorithm 1. So, while considering together the iteration times and the image quality, Algorithm 3 is preferred. We use this algorithm for the following fragility and tampering localization experiments.
Compared with the results of the fragile (or semi-fragile) watermarking methods [11] - [19] , [21] - [24] , our experimental results show that the GCD fixed point method performs much better in transparence. In our statistical results, even the minimum PSNR value is higher than 51dB ( Fig. 3 (b) ). Moreover, with the change of the values of σ , the PSNR value of the GCD fixed point images can be adjusted freely in a continuous interval, which can satisfy different degree of quality requirements for images. This character is interesting as in other methods for integrity authentication the PSNR can only take some few values.
D. Fragility
The fragility is closely related to the sparsity of fixed points, which is confirmed by our experimental results presented below, showing that the modified GCD transform satisfies the first condition presented in Section II. Due to the sparsity, a fixed point image is very fragile, since in theory almost any modification can transfer it to a non-fixed point image.
To test the sensitivity of the fixed point images, we do the single pixel tampering experiment for different values of σ . The experiment is performed 1000 times for each σ = 300, 350, . . . , 700; each time, a randomly selected pixel is (slightly) modified by a small value equal to plus or minus 10 at random. The Lena image of size 512 × 512 is used in our simulation; as before, the gaussian kernel corresponding to each σ is modified at three points to abtain the modified gaussian kernel. Table I shows the PSNR values of the fixed point images, and the number of correct judgements in 1000 experiments.
Algorithm 3 (Based on Method 3)
The PSNR values show that the image quality is very well conserved; the statistical results of correct judgement show that fixed point images are fragile, and even in the worst case where σ = 700, the propotion of correct judgements is very high: when we change the value of one pixel, the change is detected with probability 96.5%; accordingly, if we change the values of two pixels, the change can be found with probability 1-0.035 2 = 0.999. So even if just a very small number of pixels are modified, the tampered image is almost impossible to pass the authentication. Specifically, with the secret key "500.000 1 2 0.5 3 1 0.5 10 10 0.6", we work out a fixed point Lena image, and do the fragility tests with respect to some usual attacks: rewriting, JPEG compression, contrast adjustment, low-pass filter, noise, cropping, scaling, rotation, flipping and brightness. The simulation result is given in Table II , from which we see that each attack mentioned above fails to pass the authentication test.
The security of our key generation system is confirmed by the authentication result about rewriting attack. Even if the key used by an attacker is very close to the original key owned by the sender, the new fixed point image cannot pass the authentication, since different keys have very small probability to produce identical fixed point images.
For the JPEG compression, low-pass filter, contrast adjustment and noise attacks, although the basic features of the fixed point image are well kept after the attacks, the modified image is a non-fixed point image, which cannot pass the authentication.
If the size of a fixed point image is changed under an attack, then the GCD transform possessed by both the receiver and the sender will vary, since a GCD transform is built from both the key and the image size. Thus an attacked image with a different image size cannot pass the authentication, because in general different GCD transforms have different fixed points. This is confirmed by the fragility test with respect to the scaling attacks and cropping attacks.
The rotation, flipping and brightness attacks can be detected by the integrity authentication, because the modified Gaussian kernel is not central symmetric, nor axial symmetric, and Theorems 3, 4 and 5 are no longer valid without the symmetry properties.
E. Tampering Localization
With Boat image, we test the localization character of the fixed point images with respect to three different secret keys. In the simulation, ten kinds of local attacks are used for modifying the fixed point images, and the tampered areas are marked with black rectangles (see Fig. 4 (a) ). Three localization results with respect to different keys are shown respectively in Fig. 4 (b, c, d) , where the suspicious areas are marked with white spots. From these figures, we can see that more tampering points are localized when σ takes smaller values, showing that the tampering localization ability is affected by the value of σ . The reason would be that the smaller the value of σ , the sparser the fixed point images.
The experimental results show that the detected tampered areas correspond very well the real modifications. Most of localization errors are near the edges of the tampered areas, and few scattered error points are distributed in the whole image. In fact, during the GCD calculation, each pixel is mainly influenced by its neighbors. So most of the un-tampered areas are well kept after the GCD calculation, and the wrong localizations are near the tampered areas. The scattered localization errors may depend on the use of Fourier transform and the modification of the Gaussian kernel.
In the authentication results, there are three hollow rectangles for three attacks: the Cover attack with a constant, the Collage Attack and the Copy attack from itself. For the cover attack, we use a constant image (which is a fixed point image with respect to any GCD transform) to cover a region of the attacked image; for the Collage Attack we use a part of another fixed point image with the same key to replace a region of the attacked image; for the Copy attack we use a part of the same image to replace another part. In all the three cases, the attacking images are parts of fixed point images; since the attacked image is also a fixed point image, only the boundaries can be localized as tampered areas. This explains why we obtain hollow rectangles. Remark that since a constant image is always a fixed point image with respect to all GCD transform, the Cover attack with a constant can also be considered as a special Collage attack.
VIII. SEMI-FRAGILE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we present a semi-fragile authentication system based on Theorems 3, 4 and 5. Its effectiveness is demonstrated by an experiment. A comparison is made with other methods on the robustness against the rotation, flipping and brightness attacks.
By Theorems 3, 4 and 5, the GCD transform can be used to build a semi-fragile authentication system. However, as discussed in Section VII, an authentication system based on the Gaussian kernel is not safe enough. To improve the safety of the system, we first introduce a simple addition transform whose composition with the GCD transform has both the semi-fragility and the good safety.
A. Security and Semi-Fragility
In order to improve the security, we first introduce an addition transform to enlarge the key space. We assume that the sender and the receiver agree on a random number generator, which has a secure key system. Let H k0 be a random integer matrix depending on a secure secret key k0. For an original image I ∈ Z M×N 256 , we introduce a chaotic transform h k0 (I ) = I + H k0 and its inverse transform h −1 k0 (I ) = I − H k0 , where H k0 has the same size as I . Then, using the GCD transform f σ (·), we get
] with probability 1 (recall Theorem 1). With this composition transform, we can easily design three specific algorithms similar to those introduced in Section VII, whose details are omitted here. We take the composition of k0 and σ as the final secret key k of the authentication system. Since k0 is secure, the authentication system is secure too.
To keep the semi-fragility of f σ (·), the matrix H k0 is requested to be central symmetric and axial symmetric. Then by the proof of Theorems 3, 4 and 5, we can easily prove that
] is commutative with the rotation transform, the transpose and the translation: that is, Theorems 3, 4 and 5 still hold with f σ (·) replaced by h −1 k0 [ f σ (h k0 (·))]. Notice that the symmetry requirement to H k0 does not make the authentication system to lose the security as long as the image size is not too small. In the following example, we show how to produce the random integer matrix H k0 , which is used in our simulation.
Example: We begin with the zero matrix H k0 = 0 of size M × N (the same size asI ) and a random vector (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x 3n ) generated from a key k0, and we generate the random integer matrix H k0 as follows. 1) Take the first three numbers (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) from the random vector, and add x 3 to each element in line x 1 and column x 2 of H k0 ; if x 1 (resp. x 2 ) is large than M (resp. N), replace it by the remainder after dividing it by M (resp. N). 2) Rotate clockwise the matrix obtained in the previous step by 90 degrees, and add x 3 to each element in line x 1 and column x 2 (notice that the image size is N × M). 3) Repeat the second step twice and get a central symmetric and axial symmetric matrix, and rotate clockwise it by 90 degrees and name it H 0 again. 4) Repeat the first three steps 1), 2), 3) for the next three numbers (x 4 , x 5 , x 6 ), and so on, until we use up all the numbers of the random vector. Fig. 5 concerns a tampering localization test for the Boat image, after a series of inadvertent attacks (including rotation, flipping and brightness) and malicious attacks (as indicated in Fig. 4 ). Firstly, we use an algorithm (which is similar to the third algorithm in Section VII) to find a fixed point boat image; secondly, we attack the fixed point image in ten areas with ten different methods; thirdly, we attack the fixed point image with four attacks: rotate it by 90 degrees (Fig. 5 (a) ), turn it upside down ( Fig. 5 (b) ), add 5 to it to improve its brightness ( Fig. 5 (c) ) and perform a composite attack with the three attack ( Fig. 5 (d) ); finally, we do the fixed point test and record the suspicious points ( Fig. 5 (e, f, g and h) ). The simulation result is consistent with Theorems 3, 4 and 5. If a fixed point image is only attacked by the inadvertent attacks, it is also a fixed point image; if malicious tampers exist, the inadvertent attacks do not influence the localization to the malicious tampers.
B. Experiment for Semi-Fragility
Notice that if the brightness is changed too much, some pixel values may jump out of Z 256 , and after the truncation operation, these pixels will be marked as suspicious points in the authentication process; for a discrete image function, Theorem 3 holds only when the rotation degree is a multiple of 90 degrees. Compared with the localization results in Fig. 4 , we get only one hollow rectangle corresponding to the collage attack. The reason is that, influenced by the random matrix H k0 , a constant image is not a fixed point of the new compound function, and only the copy attacks from the symmetric positions can lead to hollow rectangle.
C. Comparison
Compared with other methods, our semi-fragile authentication system based on GCD transform performs perfectly in resisting to rotation attack of a multiple of 90 degrees, flipping attack and brightness attack. Although these attacks are simple, and have been discussed in many papers, the authentication accuracy of the known methods is not so satisfying. Table III shows the comparison result, where the rotation, flipping and brightness attacks are considered, and the evaluations "perfect, high, fair, low" are used when the authentication accuracy is "1, ≥ 0.9, ≥0.6 and <0.6," respectively.
For Digital signature or hashing methods [5] , [6] , the robust information can resist JPEG compression, filtering, noise addition, small-angle rotations, etc., but it is not good at resisting flipping and brightness attacks. For watermark methods [11] - [14] , the tampering localization is invalid when these attacks are considered; the Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT) or Discrete Wavelet Transformation (DWT) techniques are suitable for resisting JPEG compression, filtering, etc., but they are not so suitable for resisting the brightness attack. Furthermore, the authentication result is finally decided by the similarity between the robust information of the original image and that of an attacked image (or the similarity between the original watermark and the watermark extracted from the attacked image), and an empirical threshold is necessary to make the final judgment, so a wrong authentication result can take place with a non-negligible probability. By contrast, with the fixed point image method, the authentication system is simpler and perfectly reliable.
IX. CONCLUSION
We propose a new image integrity authentication scheme based on fixed point theory. In the proposed scheme, the following three criterions are considered for selecting an appropriate transform f k (·) whose fixed points are used for image integrity authentication. 1) Fragility: the fixed points of f k (·) must be sparse; 2) easy calculation: a fixed point can be easily found by few iterations; 3) transparence: a fixed point can be found in a very small neighborhood of a given image function. We construct an appropriate transform f k (·) satisfying these criterions, based on the Gaussian Convolution and Deconvolution, called GCD transform. After establishing a theorem for the existence of fixed points of the GCD transform f k (·), we give algorithms for a quick calculation of a fixed point image which is very close to the given image, and for the whole image integrity authentication scheme using the obtained fixed point image. The semi-fragility problem is also mathematically considered via the commutativity of transforms. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme has very good performance.
